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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
In the current times of severe economic downturn of the world economy, high rise of 
unemployment and unseen austerity measures, governments around the world seek for 
acceptable solutions to support their deficit reduction strategies. Straightforward decrease of 
government expenditure is a politically more complex area since it commonly involves 
reduction of welfare and other public services. Governments hence tend to primarily focus on 
the increase of tax revenue. In this context, levying a tax on the stock of wealth and property 
becomes an especially appealing topic pushed further up to the top of political agenda. In 
conjunction to the public outrage against multinational companies such as Starbucks, 
Amazon and Google in the United Kingdom which are able through convoluted tax 
optimisation schemes reduce their tax bills to the minimum, heavier taxing of ‘rich’ occurs to 
be even more popular and is currently on debate.          
Levying a tax on wealth always involves passionate debates. From one perspective, it 
supports redistribution of the wealth among people and creates fairer and more equal society.
1
 
Critics on the other hand see unjustified confiscation of private property through a multiple 
economic taxation, high administrative costs and argue that it has sufficient negative effects 
on the national economy. In addition, there are number of practical difficulties such as future 
pension rights or taxing a ‘human capital’.2 Due to these conflicting perspectives, it is not a 
surprise that taxation of wealth within the European countries differs enormously. In April 
2013, there were only a handful of countries within the OECD and only one within the 
European Union which remained to tax net wealth of their residents.
3
 Several other OECD 
countries rescinded their wealth tax in last two decades.
4
  
The research conducted by the National Equality Panel of the United Kingdom evidences that 
wealth inequalities within the OECD members are number of times more extreme in contrast 
to income inequalities.
5
 The United Kingdom has never in its history applied a tax which 
would fall within the meaning of net wealth tax as it is understood nowadays. Indeed, various 
forms of wealth including the land and property are a considerable contributor to a quality of 
                                                 
1
 Kayte Lawton and Howard Reed, ‘Property and Wealth Taxes in the UK, The context for reform’ 2013, 
Institute for Public Policy and Research: Discussion paper, pp.10-14 
2
 Robin Boadway et al., ‘Chapter: 8 Taxation of Wealth and Wealth Transfers’ 2011, Mirrlees Review, (Oxford 
University Press: September 2011), pp.737-739 
3
 Iceland, France, Norway and Switzerland. France is the only member of the EU which applies net wealth 
taxation. Iceland re-introduced net wealth tax only temporarily for tax years 2009-2014.  
4
 Spain in 2008; Sweden in 2007; Finland, Iceland and Luxembourg in 2006; the Netherlands in 2001; Denmark 
and Germany in 1997; Austria in 1994 for further information see Åsa Hansson, ‘Is the Wealth Tax Harmful to 
Economic Growth?’ 2010, February World Tax Journal 19-34 
5
 John Hills et al., ‘An anatomy of economic inequality in the UK: Report of the National Equality Panel’ 2010, 
(Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion: London), accessed online via < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100212235759/http:/www.equalities.gov.uk/pdf/NEP%20Report%
20bookmarkedfinal.pdf> 1-457, p.61 
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living. While 10% of the society owns over 40% of the entire wealth in the country,
6
 none of 
the governments had decided to mitigate these inequalities by net wealth tax. On the other 
hand, the United Kingdom applies various types of taxation of wealth transfers, especially 
Inheritance tax and Stamp Duty tax. The current system is unpopular and alleged to be unfair 
and inefficient. Concepts of fairness and efficiency will be examined in the second chapter. 
For the following reasons the United Kingdom is of a particular interests of this paper. Still, 
the discussion about net wealth tax and property taxation might be relevant for other 
Members of the European Union.
7
      
Wealth taxation is often fuelled by the pay-ability principle justification. It is suggested that 
there is a greater ability to pay from the capital income in contrast to the earned income since 
it is more secure and stable.
8
 However, it does not necessarily make it automatically justified 
to tax it harder or even twice. An alternative justification is the ‘use it or lose it’ principle 
which originates in the economic theory of using all possible resources available to improve 
the efficiency of the national economy.
9
 These and other justifications for the wealth taxation 
will be analysed in detail in later stages of this paper.      
Property tax, the form of wealth taxation imposed on the property is an impersonal in rem 
type of the levy. In the past, the United Kingdom used to apply various forms of property tax 
including rather simplistic ‘Window tax’ introduced in 1696 based on the number of 
windows in a dwelling. At the moment however, the only Council tax is levied on properties. 
Council tax is a hybrid of consumption and property taxes since it is levied according to the 
value of the property, however occupiers carry the burden to pay for it.
10
 In addition, the 
effective tax rate steadily decreases as the values of dwelling increases. It is therefore 
regressive tax what makes it an untypical property or wealth tax.
11
 A number of 
commentators argue that Council tax should be heavily reformed in order to be more efficient 
and to be more reflective to the values of the properties. 
1.2 Purpose 
In the context of the current pressurised political and economic situation, the purpose of this 
paper is to analyse whether net wealth and property taxation would be a more desirable 
alternative to other forms of wealth transfer taxation applied in the current system. In other 
words, the paper endeavours to suggest an optimal taxation system for the United Kingdom 
in respect of wealth and property taxation. Optimal taxation criteria shall be set in the Chapter 
2. Since both of these taxes are highly controversial, this paper will assess their positive and 
                                                 
6
 James Mirrlees et al., ‘Tax by Design: the Mirrlees Review’ (Oxford University Press: September 2011), 
ISBN: 978-0-19-955374-7, pp.349-351 
7
 Jan Schnellenbach, ‘The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues’ 2012, Volume 12 (4) Public 
Finance and Management 1-36, pp.2-4 
8
 Christer Silfverberg, ‘The Swedish Net Wealth Tax – Main Features and Problems’ 2002, No.44 Scandinavian 
studies in law, ISSN 0085-5944, 367-374, p.368 
9
 Jan Schnellenbach, ‘The Economics of Taxing Net Wealth: A Survey of the Issues’ 2012, Volume 12 (4) Public 
Finance and Management 1-36, p.23 
10
 If the property is unoccupied, the burden is placed back on the owners of the property.  
11
 Kayte Lawton and Howard Reed, ‘Property and Wealth Taxes in the UK, The context for reform’ 2013, 
Institute for Public Policy and Research: Discussion paper, p.10 
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negative aspects from three different perspectives: legal theory, economic and social. While 
this topic is highly political, this paper will attempt to avoid any value statements and 
political analysis and remain entirely academic and theoretical. The overall analysis and 
further proposals shall always be made on, at minimum, budget-neutral basis since the 
current economic situation does not realistically permit any tax revenue reductions.  
This paper will investigate the current taxation system related to property taxes and wealth 
transfer taxes. Since the present Inheritance tax, Stamp Duty tax, and Council tax are often 
criticised to be unfair or inefficient or both, it is important to study them individually. While 
notions of equity and fairness are normative issues, the paper will refer to them according to 
standards suggested by leading economists.
12
 It is equally important to highlight that none of 
these taxes bring substantial revenue to the budget hence their whole existence is uncertain. 
Having this in mind, the paper will examine whether it is possible to adjust these taxes to be 
more fair and efficient or whether net wealth and general property taxation would not be a 
better option to them.  
1.3 Methodology and Materials 
The analysis of the role of taxation in the society plays a major role in the public finance. 
This master thesis will therefore be a public finance research. The key issue in this research 
deals with analysing applicability of net wealth and property taxation in the United Kingdom. 
It will provide a comparative study with other taxes which have their place in the current 
system. Is it plausible to introduce net wealth and property taxation in the UK? Would it be 
more fair and efficient in contrast to current wealth transfer taxes and hybrid property tax?  
The hypothesis of this paper is that even though net wealth tax might seem to be as the ideal 
solution for an increase of the tax revenue in the United Kingdom which would similarly not 
harm the economy but would help to fairly distribute wealth amongst the society, it would not 
be a constructive development for the United Kingdom as a whole. Similarly, but without so 
strong conviction, a general property tax as the addition to current Council tax would not be a 
prudent decision. On the other hand, the current taxation system requires number of changes 
to be converted into a fairer and more efficient system.  
Parameters for an analysis whether net wealth and property taxation would be a more 
desirable alternative to other forms of wealth transfer taxation applied in the current system 
and for suggesting an optimal tax system for the United Kingdom are equity and efficiency of 
the system; administration and compliance costs; and potential for tax avoidance set in the 
following chapter. Consequently, conclusions of this research will be drawn from a weighing 
of positive and negative effects found in considering the above mentioned parameters.    
There are a number of research methods suitable to attest or refute the hypothesis. The first 
part of the analysis will set a theoretical framework for each form of the discussed taxation 
and assess it through a modern legal realism theory. It is definitely complicated to precisely 
                                                 
12
 See Chapter 2 
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define modern legal realism due to various contradicting doctrines
13
 however this theory 
underlines the gap between individuals’ rights and obligations. In addition, it pays an 
adequate attention on the connection of the law and sociology.
14
 Legal realism permits 
mutual contradictions of laws or legal principles as long there are clear and definite ways of 
adjudicating which shall apply in particular circumstances. For realists, taxation fits into an 
institutional vision of law where inner morality is imperative. Based on these foundations, the 
essay will discuss different types of taxation firstly through pay-ability principle and later 
through economic and social arguments. ‘Fair’ taxation and social justice will be included in 
the discussion.  
While legal and social analyses shall be mainly based on theoretical research, the economic 
analysis will also rely on the secondary analysis of the data that have already been collected 
and investigated by other researches. This is mainly due to high costs and impracticability of 
conducting own empirical research.    
The thesis will accordingly analyse various sources of law and materials accessible in hard 
copies or electronically such as: doctrinal articles; tax studies and reviews, fundamental tax 
legal and public finance theories; primary law concerning specific forms of taxation; and 
news articles from trusted providers. Being an academic research, this paper will mainly rely 
on studies provided by recognised scholars and economists. The selection of sources shall be 
made objectively with the endeavour to provide studies of academics of diverse viewpoints. 
There is a major supply of material concerning desirable features of a tax system, however 
only limited number of those is focused on net wealth and property taxation and even fewer 
amounts provide empirical studies examining their effects.   
1.4 Structure 
The thesis is divided into the following six sections. The first part will provide a brief 
overview of the background information related to the research topic. This will be crucial for 
a reader to understand the importance and credibility of the study. The second part shall 
provide a theoretical framework which will define features of a desirable tax system hence 
the following parts will be able to compare and contrast different taxes. The third part will 
focus on the analysis of the current system and its need for an improvement. Particularly, the 
paper will assess social problems and inequality in the modern United Kingdom; along with 
fairness and efficiency of the existing wealth transfer taxes and hybrid property taxation. 
Thereafter, two following (Fourth and Fifth) sections will be the core of this thesis. They will 
methodically scrutinise all positive and negative factors of net wealth and property taxation. 
The theoretical framework with a historical perspective of both of them will be made. 
Furthermore, at the end of each of these sections comprehensible interim conclusions shall be 
provided. Sixth part shall provide a discussion with comparisons of net wealth tax to current 
wealth transfer taxes; and property tax to Council tax. The final section will present 
                                                 
13
 Morton Horwitz, ‘The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 : The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy’ 1992, 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford), pp.185-195 
14
 Stephen Ackroyd, ‘Critical Realism, Organization Theory, Methodology, and the Emerging Science of 
Reconfiguration’ 2010, (Springer Berlin: Heidelberg), pp.47-77 
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conclusions of the entire research and shall provide plausible proposals for enhancement of 
the current system. In particular, the summary will recapitulate arguments for affirming or 
refuting the original hypothesis of this paper.     
1.5 Delimitations 
The research is limited to the wealth and property taxation. Also, the analysis of this paper 
whether the implementation of net wealth and property taxation is a plausible proposition for 
the modern economy shall be geographically restricted for the United Kingdom only. This is 
due to high wealth inequalities within the society; and criticism of the current wealth transfer 
taxes. Consequently, sufficient amount of attention will be paid towards examining of the 
strengths and weakness of the current British tax system.  
The author is aware of budgetary limitation laws of the European Union encompassed in 
Stability and Growth Pact
15
 or more recently in so-called the Fiscal Compact
16
 which have a 
direct effect on the national fiscal policy with the aim to decrease the annual deficit of each 
member state. Similarly, researched taxes might have further implications on the free 
movement provisions of the European Union, especially free movement of capital provided 
by the Article 63 TFEU. However since this paper is principally focused on public finance 
research, these aspects will not be taken into account.   
While the research will be made also from the social perspective, effects on an individual will 
not be largely taken into account since consequences of researched taxes on the society as a 
whole are more significant for the purposes of this study.  
Lastly, this thesis is strictly limited to the amount of resources and alien empirical data used. 
Precise data covering effects of the current wealth transfer tax; the amount of the current tax 
avoidance; of the tax collection if the property or net wealth tax would be implemented; and 
the amount of potential avoidance of such taxes would be extremely vital. Conclusions shall 
be therefore viewed only as provisional and more research is required to affirm or refute 
findings of this research using different techniques, data and methodology.           
The research is finalised on 25 May 2013. Any material published after this date is not taken 
into consideration. 
2 Desirable features of a tax system 
Tax systems around the world do not develop in a vacuum therefore they are affected by 
various economic, political and social factors. Still there are fundamental standards suggested 
by leading economists to appraise the quality of a particular tax system. Four of these criteria 
are crucial: equity, efficiency, operating costs of running that system and amount of possible 
                                                 
15
 The Stability and Growth Pact ratified in 1997 is an agreement between members of the Economic and 
Monetary Union with the main purpose to facilitate and maintain fiscal disciple amongst individual states. 
16
 The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (Fiscal 
Compact) ratified in 2012 
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tax avoidance. This chapter will in brief illustrate these criteria and following chapters will 
refer back to them. 
2.1 Efficiency 
Notions of efficiency and equity differ significantly since the former is a positive, objective 
criterion and the latter is a normative, subjective criterion.
17
 ‘Economics....deals with the 
efficient use of resources in best satisfying consumer needs.’18 There are two leading concepts 
of efficiency named after economists who proposed them. According to Pareto efficiency, an 
economic arrangement cannot be classified as efficient if it makes better off one person but 
harms another. If however an economic arrangement worsens the position of ones, it could 
still be treated as an efficient arrangement provided that the winners are able to entirely 
compensate the losers.
19
 The actual compensation does not have to take place. It is 
consequently advisable that states shall take only those actions which produce more social 
benefits than social costs.
20
 This would be Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
In respect to the matter of efficient tax design, it must be mentioned that every tax imposes a 
cost on the taxpayer which consequently affects his economic decisions and distorts efficient 
selection.
21
 This distortion of economic decisions is referred to as an excess burden or a 
deadweight loss. The major dilemma of the inefficient tax design based on distorting taxes is 
that it brings no advantage to the taxpayer and no more revenue for the state.
22
 Every efficient 
tax system shall therefore aim to minimise the excess burden. 
From the perspective of efficiency, Musgrave proposes that the least distorting tax which 
would minimise deadweight costs on economy and at the same time brings the highest 
revenue for Treasury is the head tax. On the other hand, he admits that this tax would entirely 
fail on the equity grounds.
23
      
2.2 Equity 
In contrast to efficiency, the concept of equity is more controversial. Notions of equity and 
fairness are normative issues and depend on ones considerations therefore they could barely, 
in the first glance, be described as persuasive economic or legal arguments for the existence 
of a particular tax system.
24
 For instance, Prof. Block totally rejects to recognize ethical 
                                                 
17
 Russell Sobel, ‘Handbook of Public Finance’, 2006 (Kluwer, Chapter 2- Welfare Economics and Public 
Finance), p.20 
18
 Richard Musgrave and Peggy Musgrave, ‘Public Finance in theory and practice’ 1989, (McGraw-Hill 
International Editions: New York 5td Ed.), p.60 
19
 Russell Sobel, ‘Handbook of Public Finance’, 2006 (Kluwer, Chapter 2- Welfare Economics and Public 
Finance), p.22 
20
 Edward Stringham, ‘Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and the problem of central planning’ 2001, Volume 4, Number 2 
Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 41-50 
21
 Harvey Rosen and Ted Gayer, ‘Public Finance’ 2007, (McGraw-Hill: New York 8th Edition), p.331 
22
 Chris Jones, ‘Applied Welfare Economics’ 2005 (Oxford University Press: Oxford), pp.173-176 
23
 Richard Musgrave and Peggy Musgrave, ‘Public Finance in theory and practice’ 1989, (McGraw-Hill 
International Editions: New York 5td Ed.), p.279 
24
 Nick Pearce, ‘Rethinking fairness’ 2007, Volume 14(1) Public Policy Research 11-22 
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presumptions justifying taxation on moral grounds and claims that taxation must based only 
on objective foundations accepted and defined by the society.
25
 
Rawls suggests a procedural theory of fairness. Every fair outcome must be based on fair 
process.
26
 Consistent with this assumption, visible inequalities within the society may still be 
treated as equitable, as long as the process which produced was also fair. In regards to 
taxation, equitable tax structure design is where every tax payer pays its fair share to the cost 
of government. At the heart of this idea is however again the dilemma of an exact definition 
of what is a fair share.  
One of the approaches of defining fair share dates back to classical economics as Adam 
Smith.
27
 A taxpayer shall be bound to contribute to the common budget in the level equal to 
benefits he receives from public services. As it can be seen, this theory mainly takes into 
account tax expenditure policy and does not provide any redistribution within the society.   
In contrast, more contemporary economists centre their attention on the pay-ability principle 
which is fuelled by the redistribution objective. In their view, an equitable system is one 
which forces a taxpayer with higher ability to contribute more to a common budget and those 
with less ability to contribute a smaller amount. Logically, taxpayers of the same ability shall 
contribute equally. Economists define former as vertical equity and the latter horizontal 
equity. Complications arise if a source of one’s ability to pay differs. For instance, shall a 
capital income be treated equally to earned income? Lack of quantitative rules which would 
have potential to precisely measure the ability-to pay renders this equitable criterion to be 
imperfect. Hypothetically, a combination of the total welfare which an individual may obtain 
from opportunities available to him, including consumption, holding of wealth and enjoyment 
of leisure may be suitable determine one’s ability to pay. This is however impracticable since, 
for example, value of leisure cannot be measured.
28
            
Apart of the theoretical concept of fairness briefly discussed in this subsection, the paper 
shall refer to empirical equity of taxation or public perception of fairness. 
2.3 Administration and compliance costs 
Following features of a desirable tax system are low administration and compliance costs. 
Some academics include, for lucid reasons, this feature into efficiency criterion. For clarity 
purposes, it shall be examined separately. 
Administration costs are costs to the government for conducting an assessment and collection 
of taxes. Compliance costs on the other hand are costs spent by a taxpayer in complying with 
tax obligations. Prof. Evans believes that every government shall be extremely aware of 
                                                 
25
 Walter Block, ‘Public Finance Texts Cannot Justify Government Taxation: A Critique’ 2011 36 Canadian 
Public Administration 252-262 
26
 John Rawls, ‘A theory of justice’ 1999 (Harvard University Press: Harvard), pp.10-12 
27
 Adam Smith, ‘Wealth of Nations’ 1776 
28
 Richard Musgrave and Peggy Musgrave, ‘Public Finance in theory and practice’ 1989, (McGraw-Hill 
International Editions: New York 5td Ed.), p.223 
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operating costs of the tax system. The ratio between the costs of administering and collecting 
taxes borne by government and costs spent by a taxpayer against the total revenue of a 
particular tax shall be kept as little possible.
29
 Conversely, various studies evidence that costs 
of tax collection, tax enforcement and compliance costs amount to up to 12% of the entire tax 
revenue.
30
    
Shaw et al. suggest that modern ‘optimal tax theory’ has been for considerable amount of 
time overlooking the importance of administration and compliance costs and kept focusing 
only on distortions of public behaviour, referred to as ‘distortion costs’.31 On the other hand, 
he claims that it is feasible to amend the current system to reflect operating costs. It would 
then comprise authentic characters of tax administration such as fines for tax evasion, costs of 
reporting obligations and enquiry rates. Munk supports stance that only a marginal 
development has been made in respect of implementation of administration costs into the 
theory of optimal taxation and emphasizes the importance of empirical research which shall 
provide comprehensive evidence that a particular tax bears only limited amount operating 
costs.
32
        
2.4 Tax avoidance 
The last criterion of a desirable tax system to be discussed is a potential amount of tax 
avoidance. It is relatively simple to ascertain that tax avoidance is a source of revenue 
leakage; it increases costs of the system and affects complexity of tax law.
33
 Tax avoidance 
presents an immense problem for every government since it endangers efficiency and equity 
of tax the system.
34
 For instance, excessively complicated system which encourages taxpayer 
to tax avoidance is not to be perceived as desirable.
35
 Equally undesirable is a system which 
would be impossible to precisely administer to prevent possible tax avoidance, or if such 
administration would be exceptionally expensive.
36
 
While states may adopt strict enforcement approach which encompasses high penalties on 
evaders and burdens taxpayers with frequent tax audits, fight again tax avoidance cannot be 
                                                 
29
 Chris Evans, ‘Counting the costs of taxation: an exploration of recent developments’ 2006, in London School 
of Economics Capital Markets seminar series presented at London School of Economics Capital Markets 
seminar series, London, England, 16 October 2006, pp.1-3 
30
 Chris Evans, ‘Studying the studies: an overview of recent research into taxation operating costs’ 2003, 
Volume 1 Journal of Tax Research 64-92 
31
 Jonathan Shaw et al., ‘Chapter: 12 Administration and Compliance’ 2010, Mirrlees Review, (Oxford 
University Press: April 2010), p.1101  
32
 Knud Munk, ’Tax-tariff reform with costs of tax administration’ 2008, Volume 15 Issue 6 International Tax 
and Public Finance 647-667, pp.648 and 659  
33
 Jonathan Shaw et al., ‘Chapter: 12 Administration and Compliance’ 2010, Mirrlees Review, (Oxford 
University Press: April 2010), p.1102-1103 
34
 Martin Besfamille and Cecilia Sirrito, ‘Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies’ 
2009, Volume 9 Issue 6 Journal of Public Economic Theory 897-926, pp. 898-901 
35
 Joel Slemrod, ‘Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration’ 2002 Volume 3 Handbook of Public Economics 
1423-1470, pp.1424, 1428 and 1460 
36
 Martin Feldstein, ‘Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax’ 1999 Volume 81 Number 4 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 674-680, pp.674-676 
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separated from the design of optimal tax.
37
 In this respect, prudent tax designer shall 
minimise the potential for tax avoidance by avoiding blurred boundaries of a tax base.     
3 Current taxation system 
The previous chapter has examined the features of a desirable tax system. This chapter will 
provide a brief overview and analyses of Stamp Duty, Inheritance and Council taxes 
effectiveness and functionality in order to be able to scrutinise in the following part, whether 
net wealth and property taxation might be a better alternative to them. 
3.1 Budget Deficit and Social inequality 
The underlying rationale behind virtually every tax is a raise of revenue which it brings for 
the national budget. According to the Office for National Statistics in the United Kingdom, 
British economy has only narrowly avoided triple-dip recession during the first quarter of 
2013.
38
 In the fiscal year 2012/2013 the deficit amounted to almost 8%
39
 what underscored an 
importance for higher tax revenue since austerity measures taken by the government are 
already beginning to cause a social unrest within the country. In addition, enormous 
economic stimulus projects were commenced to counterbalance the recession.  
In this state of affairs of rising public debt and budgets in a state of disorder, voices from 
various backgrounds suggest that the introduction of net wealth or property taxation would 
help to deal with severe fiscal challenges of the economy and consolidate public finances. For 
an instance, Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom disclosed his intentions to raise 
the tax revue through wealth tax in autumn 2012.
40
 While his proposals have only limited 
chances for success in the current government with the Conservative party, it highlights an 
increasing overall opinion of the population for ‘rich to pay their fair share’.        
Undoubtedly, various forms of wealth including the land and property are a considerable 
contributor to a quality of living. Historically wealth in the United Kingdom is distributed 
predominantly unevenly. According to the National Statistics, 10% of the society owns over 
40% of the entire wealth in the country.
41
 The redistribution of the wealth argument was the 
rationale for the Labour government in 1974 to create a Green Paper on the implementation 
of the wealth tax in the UK stating: ‘...the government is committed to using the taxation 
system to promote greater social and economic equality. This requires a redistribution of 
                                                 
37
 Martin Besfamille and Cecilia Sirrito, ‘Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies’ 
2009, Volume 9 Issue 6 Journal of Public Economic Theory 897-926, p.898 
38
 BBC official website, ‘UK economy avoids triple-dip recession’ 25 April 2013, accessed via 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-22290407> 
39
 Office for National Statistics- official website, ‘Statistical bulletin: Public Sector Finances, March 2013’ 23 
April 2013, accessed via < http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/psa/public-sector-finances/march-2013/stb---march-
2013.html#tab-Public-sector-net-borrowing> 
40
 BBC official website, ‘Lib Dem conference: Clegg promises to push for wealth tax’ 23 September 2013, 
accessed via <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-19690327> 
41
 James Mirrlees et al., ‘Tax by Design: the Mirrlees Review’ (Oxford University Press: September 2011), 
ISBN: 978-0-19-955374-7, pp.349-351 
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wealth as well as income...’.42 The wealth tax has however never been implemented. There is 
number of evidences which support an argument that high inequalities have negative effects 
on the growth rate however these will be discussed in detail in later parts of this paper. 
To get an entire picture of the social inequalities and differences of the wealth distribution 
within the United Kingdom it is fruitful to mention few further facts: 
 ‘The wealthiest tenth is over 850 times wealthier than the least wealthy tenth of 
households. 
 A household required total wealth greater than £967,000 to belong to the wealthiest 
10% of the distribution. 
 The poorer 50% of households possess in average net wealth of £4400 in contrast to 
£1.2 million net wealth owned by the top 10% 
 Over half of the combined wealth held by the top 10% of households was private 
pension wealth.’ 43  
As it is apparent from the evidence provided by the Office for National Statistics, there are 
massive inequalities in overall, however differences in the private pensions are the most 
striking since the top 10% average pension savings equals to £742 000 in contrast to £4 000 
of the bottom 50%. This important fact will be crucial for the analysis whether it would be 
plausible to implement net wealth and property taxation. 
3.2 Inheritance tax 
Inheritance tax is one of the theoretical pillars of the wealth transfer taxes of the current tax 
system in the United Kingdom. It is levied on the estate of the deceased at a rate of 40% over 
the individual threshold of £325 000. According to Lawton and Howard, only 3% of all 
deaths involved paying the inheritance tax.
44
 The annual revenue from the inheritance tax for 
the fiscal year 2012-2013 was forecasted to amount to £3bn what is less than half percent of 
total receipts;
45
 therefore its contribution for the national budget is truly trivial.  
While views about this tax are extremely polarized, in general, it is one of the most unpopular 
taxes in the United Kingdom. Boadway et al argue that it is recognized to be inequitable since 
‘...wealthy are better able to reduce the amount they pay by giving away part of their wealth 
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tax-free during their lifetimes. The moderately wealthy tend to have capital tied up in their 
house, and anti-avoidance provisions in the tax rules make it hard to ‘give away’ all or part 
of the value of a house while you are still living in it.’46 This opinion is strongly supported by 
Dolphin in his analysis and proposal for Inheritance tax abolition.
47
 In addition, the 
Inheritance Tax Act 1984 provide for number of reliefs, such as business and agriculture if it 
remains within the family which is not necessarily well targeted. The research conducted in 
2008 about how the public perceives some of the wealth taxes demonstrates, that the main 
arguments for unpopularity of inheritance tax is the rationale that people paid income tax 
through their working lives and yet their accumulated estate will be taxed again by the 
separate tax. This ‘double taxation’ is viewed by the public as unfair.48 From the practical 
perspective, there are two further unfavourable aspects of this tax. Firstly, the 40% flat rate 
does not correspond with the progressivity pattern of the income tax. Secondly, its arbitrary 
nature may result in paying both capital gains and inheritance tax or occasionally none of 
them. Lastly, Lawton and Howard well argue the strongest unreasonable ground of the 
current inheritance tax which does not take into account number of individual recipients but 
only the entire inherited estate. The effect might be that ‘a large estate left to many recipients 
would be liable for inheritance tax even if each inheritor received only a relatively small 
bequest, whereas an estate valued at just less than the married couples threshold of £650,000 
and left to a single child would not attract any tax.‘49 It will be discussed below that this 
effect runs entirely against fundamental rationales behind the inheritance tax and pay-ability 
principle. In other words, those of higher ability do not necessarily contribute more. 
Accordingly, there are situations when similar ability will be taxed unequally what makes it 
neither vertical nor horizontal equitable taxation.  
In contrast to general public, legal theorists tend to support inheritance tax. Thuronyi, for an 
instance, sees it as a complement to an income tax since it itself does not tax wealth but only 
its accretion. He rephrases an argument of an economist Cedric Sanford,
50
 that it would be 
not desirable to allow unfettered intergenerational transfers of substantial wealth since there 
is a strong moral justification to tax heirs who have done nothing to earn their wealth.
51
 
Accordingly, it could be viewed as abnormal to tax those who acquire their wealth by effort 
but not to tax others who inherit substantial wealth without any effort whatsoever. It might be 
also viewed as similar rationalisation to the pay-ability principle since the recipient is the 
position when his ability to contribute to the society is greater. A commonly discussed 
argument is so called Cornegie effect. Considerable wealth left to a recipient might entirely 
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deaden recipient’s endeavours, talents and energies. Subsequently, it would lead to less 
efficient and worthy life than he otherwise would have.
52
 While this is a valid argument, it 
must be mentioned that if hypothetically an heir would be bequeathed an estate of the value 
of £5m, virtually every inheritance tax would still leave him a wealth that ‘deadens his 
talents’.  
It could be seen that there are entirely different viewpoints on this issue. The public tend to 
focus on the perspective of a donor, who shall have a right to freely bequeath his estate which 
has already been taxed once through an income tax without a further taxation. Academics on 
the other hand centre their attention on the moral justification for taxing an effortlessly 
acquired wealth of the recipient. In this instance, it is important to return to the previously 
mentioned criticism of inheritance tax, especially that it does not take into the account 
number of recipients, but only the size of the estate. Whereas virtually all legal theorists 
condemn effortlessly acquired wealth, still the current form of Inheritance tax does not take it 
into the account what leaves it without any support arguments. 
In conclusion, the current form of Inheritance tax in the United Kingdom may only hardly be 
treated by many academics as fair and efficient. Difference in treatment of inter vivos 
transfers of wealth makes it easy to avoid it; it disregards the amount of inherited wealth for 
an individual; it presents only minor revenue for the budget and affects only three percent of 
deaths. Mainly for these reasons, academic commentators and experts suggest either to 
radically reform the current form of inheritance by decreasing the individual threshold and 
shifting the burden of tax from donor to donee which would effectively mean the creation of 
Capital Recipients tax instead.
53
 Alternatively, the inheritance is proposed to be abolished and 
that would simplify the tax system while not harming the revenue. On the other side of the 
spectrum are those as Thuronyi and Sandford who highlight that Inheritance is a vital 
complement to an income tax which it itself does not tax wealth but only its accretion. 
3.3 Stamp Duty tax 
Inheritance tax might be perceived of as a more obvious example of wealth transfer taxation 
since it deals with intergenerational transfer of wealth typically occurring within a family in 
contrast to Stamp Duty tax where the parties to the transaction are commonly unconnected. 
Stamp Duty tax is however the most widespread type of transfer wealth tax within the OECD, 
levied in 31 out of 34 member states.
54
 In addition, it contributes to the budget the most 
amongst all other wealth transfer taxes. Nevertheless it presents just over one percent of total 
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receipts.
55
 Since the paper focuses on wealth and property taxation, this section will 
principally deal with Stamp Duty land tax (SDLT) and only marginally on sale of shares in 
United Kingdom corporations. 
SDLT was introduced only ten years ago however its origins in the United Kingdom as a 
transfer tax on real estate transactions outreaches to the 1950’s. It is levied on the purchaser 
and progressively depends on the purchase price of the real estate property which falls within 
a particular threshold. In contrast to inheritance tax, it is an equitable tax. Various thresholds 
in the system practically mean that a small raise of price might substantially increase the 
purchaser costs. 
Commentators suggest that there are not apparent arguments or sound economic advantages 
of the SDLT apart of raising revenue for the budget.
56
 One hypothetical rationale behind the 
SDLT might be to offset costs for keeping records of proprietors of estates and services 
connected to that. This theory could however be relatively easily refuted. Firstly, revenue 
collected outbalances administrative costs for maintaining such records and secondly, 
purchasers are liable to pay separate fees to the Land Registry which is principally 
responsible for these records.
57
  
On the other hand, there are a number of academics who blame SDLT for distorting 
economic behaviour which consequently lead to decreased efficiency and lower economic 
output. Hence, it is according to the framework described in the Chapter 2, excessively 
inefficient tax. It is a fundamental economic theory that virtually every tax affects economic 
behaviour.
58
 The question is mainly to analyse the degree of distortions and whether there are 
positives which are able to offset them.
59
 Two trends of affected economic behaviour could 
be singled out: prices of properties for sale are kept just under the threshold and householders 
are less incentivised to move. Two separate detailed studies conducted in 2012 and 2013 
substantiate that the housing market respond to SDLT in a way that above mentioned 
economy theory predicts. There is clear evidence that SDLT negatively affects household’s 
tendency to move and the anticipation that a move is imminent. Relatively minor increase of 
SDLT has a potential to decrease the mobility by approximately 30% and might consequently 
cause a housing market to be considerably underpriced.
60
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Further criticism of the SDLT is put forward by practitioners. They suggest possible 
avoidance by artificially decreased purchased price but inflated costs of fixtures and fittings 
which are compulsory affiliated to the sale of the property.
61
 Similar practices lead to costly 
policing procedures conducted by the relevant authorities.
62
  
Taking into account lack of clear rationales behind the SDLT tax and only insignificant 
contribution which it brings to the revenue, this wealth transaction tax does not appear to be a 
lucid part of the current tax system. While there are various proposals how to reform the 
structure of the tax and subsequently increase revenue, these suggestions would only further 
negatively impact the economic behaviour and decrease the efficiency of the entire 
economy.
63
 Particularly negatively affected would be housing market and construction 
industry. On the other hand, since many developed economies apply similar form of property 
transaction tax, there is only small possibility for its abandonment in the current economic 
climate. 
3.4 Council tax 
The only tax generally levied on properties within the United Kingdom at the moment is 
Council tax which generates revenue of 4.4% of total receipts.
64
 It is a spine of local council 
finances and funds inevitable local services.
65
 The paper will not be assessing for the 
purposes of this research the so called ‘Annual Tax on Enveloped Dwellings’ (ATED) 
introduced by Finance Bill 2013 which came into effect on 1 April 2013. This is due to the 
fact that this tax will affect only residential properties of the value over £2 million not held by 
individuals but are ‘enveloped’ by a corporate entity.66 The amount of residential dwellings 
falling within the scope of this tax will hence be negligible and HMRC expects to have it no 
significant economic impact.
67
 
Council tax is a hybrid of consumption and property taxes since it is levied according to the 
value of the property however occupiers carry the burden to pay for it.
68
 The income of the 
occupier is immaterial for the purposes of setting the annual tax amount therefore the 
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traditional determinant of the pay-ability principle is lacking.
69
 Instead, dwellings are 
categorised into eight bands (A to H) depending on the estimated value of that property in 
1991, which is hard to justify over 20 years later.
70
 The nominal tax rises with the increase of 
the value of the property what partially substitutes missing income factor mentioned above. 
However, the effective tax rate
71
 steadily decreases as the values of dwelling increases. The 
current form of council tax ‘...places a greater burden on younger and poorer households 
relative to older and richer households, and on households in less prosperous regions 
compared to more affluent areas.’72 It is therefore clearly a regressive tax what makes it an 
untypical property or wealth levy. The following criticism lies with the unevenly 
concentrated properties within the taxation bands since 60% of dwellings fall within the 
bottom three bands in contrast to less than 10% fall within top three.
73
 Likewise, all 
properties valued above £320 000 in 1991 are charged by exactly the same amount.  
For the following reasons Council tax is perceived by the public to be a particularly unjust 
levy. Mirrlees et al. argue that it is unpopular in the society also because it is a highly visible 
tax. 88% of tax is remitted by firms and Council tax is paid directly by individuals on 
regular
74
 basis.
75
 Since those of comparable ability do not necessarily contribute the same 
amount, it shall not be viewed as horizontally equitable tax. Similarly, vertical equity is not 
adhered because houses over certain limit are not charged more. Commentators therefore 
tend to support public views about unfairness of this tax and suggest various reforms. 
Regarding to operating costs of Council tax, it is an efficient tax with low potential of 
avoidance. Relatively high efficiency of the tax is caused by above mentioned lack of period 
revaluation of property values.  
The vocal proposals for a reform concerns: revaluation of properties; eliminating property 
element of Council tax which would make it a clear consumption tax; to increase the amount 
of tax bands; and increase rates for the most valuable properties in order to make Council tax 
less regressive. Unquestionably, it would not be a wise proposal of this research to suggest an 
implementation of a separate property tax without proposing a reform of current Council tax. 
These taxes would only hardly run in conjunction with each other hence the mixture of them 
both will be analysed in the Chapter 6 of this paper. 
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4 Net Wealth tax 
The previous chapter has provided a brief overview and analyses of three wealth transfer 
taxes applied in the current system. This chapter will focus on positive and negative aspects 
of net wealth tax and rationales behind it. In addition, it will discuss theoretical approaches of 
tax design used to evaluate between fundamental criteria studied in the second chapter.  
In May 2013, annual net wealth tax featured tax systems of only one European Union 
member (France) and of two OECD members (Iceland,
76
 Norway and Switzerland). Several 
other OECD countries rescinded their wealth tax in last two decades for various reasons.
77
 
For instance, in Germany the constitutional court suspended net wealth tax for being 
insufficiently clear in regards to period revaluations of wealth;
78
 in Spain, it was abandoned 
as a part of the government strategy to fight against banking crisis
79
 and in Sweden it was 
abolished due to its perceived negative impacts. Regardless to past abandonments, net wealth 
tax remains to be politically attractive since its tax base is number of times larger compare to 
income tax base.  
It is important to note that wealth inequalities within the OECD members are number of 
times more extreme in contrast to income inequalities.
80
 This chapter will methodically 
scrutinise positive and negative factors of net wealth tax and analyse feasibility of its 
implementation in the United Kingdom in the context of the current tax system. 
4.1  Theoretical framework 
Analysing net wealth tax, it is essential to firstly define its base. It is a levy typically imposed 
on an individual’s net worldwide wealth (value of assets minus debts and any related 
liabilities). Based on the principle of uniformity, tangible and intangible elements of wealth 
shall be treated equally. Given that ability to pay is one of crucial underpinning principles of 
this tax, it is not levied on corporations and net wealth of corporations shall be imputed to 
owners.
81
 It is imposed sporadically
82
 or periodically,
83
 often implemented on progressive 
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rates. For the assessment purposes, wealth of the entire household or single individual might 
be taken.
84
    
4.2 Normative principles and theoretical approaches of tax design 
Designing the optimal tax system depends on criteria for evaluating and individual’s 
normative principles. Efficiency and administrative costs are regularly used as a key 
benchmark of the optimal taxation.
85
 These constraints will be used for analysing rationales 
behind and qualities of net wealth and property taxes in subsequent sections. Other academics 
also focus on political constraints of tax implementation in their assessment however it is 
outside the scope of research of this paper. 
As it was explained in the section 2.1, the efficiency element deals with distortions of 
economic behaviour, such as decision to work or to accumulate and dispose wealth. Both of 
administrative costs on sides of taxpayers and authorities are important part the evaluation 
since costs for maintaining particular tax might be higher or equal to revenue itself. In respect 
of net wealth tax, valuation of some forms of wealth might be especially complex. On the 
other hand, some wealth might be simple to hide abroad or change the legal ownership.
86
 
As it is provided by theoretical literature, further dissimilarities of optimal tax design hinge 
on the approach taken for an analysis. Utilitarian or so called ‘welfarist’, non-utilitarian and 
paternalistic approaches stand out.   
The utilitarian approach takes into account utility or welfare received by an individual and 
that determines the level of his tax liabilities. The goal is therefore welfare maximisation and 
that the tax base shall improve taxpayer’s wellbeing.87 One might on these grounds argue that 
utilitarian approach copy the rationale of pay-ability principle which is used as a common 
rationale for taxation of wealth. 
The non-utilitarian approach on the other hand focuses on the benefit of wealth for an 
individual which however must be above mere consumption and income which has already 
been taxed.
88
 Status, power and significance in the society as an additional benefit conferred 
by the wealth run counter to the principle of equal opportunities which non-utilitarianists 
borrowed from welfarists.
89
 If however the wealth shall be treated as an additional tax base, 
‘...one must be persuaded that it does provide benefits over and above those that confer 
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utility, or that the benefits that confer utility do not otherwise end up being taxed. Indeed, it 
may well be that the forms of wealth that do confer extra benefits are those that cannot be 
easily taxed, such as human capital and other personal attributes.’90 The following 
subsection dealing with drawbacks of net wealth taxation will further discuss problems 
related to human capital and personal attributes.      
Paternalism assumes that individuals are not able, for various reasons, to choose decisions 
which would be the best for them in the long run.
91
 The state has therefore a right and duty to 
take decisions for them. Boadway et al. use as example donations to charity which might be 
against individual’s self-interest however is based on ethics and social norms. Unfavourable 
tax treatment of such transactions would consequently affect one’s decision making. In 
addition, paternalists deny consumers sovereignty. They believe that since an individual is 
not able to act responsibly in regards to own savings for retirement, gambling or excessive 
consumption, a state shall take up this role for him. This idea is evidently contradictory in 
context of net wealth taxation since straightforward effect of the wealth taxation is under 
saving which encourages consumption and excessive spending. Secondly, if a state is 
concerned about one’s savings for retirement or an excessive spending, the revenue from the 
wealth tax should be allocated for an individual on his ‘personal account’ for the future and to 
be used for general welfare as welfarist approach advocates.     
4.3 Advantages and rationales of net wealth tax implementation 
4.3.1 The ability to pay principle: Net wealth tax vs. income tax  
Legal theorists propose that net wealth taxation is built on a clear idea underpinned by the 
pay-ability principle. An individual has greater ability to pay from capital income compare to 
earned income since it is more stable and secure. Hence it shall be taxed harder.
 92
 Thuronyi 
shares this opinion and illustrates it by a comparison of two individuals. Person 1 has an 
annual salary of £20 000 and Person 2 acquires the same £20 000 from his £200 000 
investment. It would be impossible to claim that Person’s 2 ability to pay is not higher.93 
Silfverberg believes that ‘net wealth tax adds a progressive dimension to the taxation of 
capital’. Since the majority of OECD members apply flat taxation on capital gains income in 
distinction to progressive taxation of the earned income, it is a logical argument that net 
wealth taxation might be used for equalising types of income. Moreover, ‘...additional tax 
capacity afforded by wealth could allow top marginal income tax rates to be reduced without 
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sacrificing overall tax progressivity.’94 Strong consumption power as the result of an extreme 
wealth of one class of the society compared to weak consumption power of the other class is 
an obstructive quality of the community and economy.
95
 In this sense, a progressive tax on 
current wealth is better than progressive tax on income.
96
   
In overall, net wealth tax would allow a government to collect higher revenue without placing 
a high tax burden on an individual.  
4.3.2 The benefit considerations 
According to the benefit rationale, a government through its provision of public services 
increases the wealth of its owner who shall be subsequently liable to finance it.
97
 Especially 
land and property values have a potential to increase without any endeavour of the proprietor 
whatsoever. The model example is the provision of transport links and schools by the 
government in the vicinity of the property. Winston Churchill argued that: ‘Roads are made, 
streets are made, services are improved, electric light turns night into day, water is brought 
from reservoirs a hundred miles off in the mountains— and all the while the landlord sits 
still. Every one of those improvements is effected by the labour and cost of other people and 
the taxpayers. To not one of those improvements does the land monopolist, as a land 
monopolist, contribute, and yet by every one of them the value of his land is enhanced.’98 
These unearned increases of wealth shall be funded back by the owner of the property.
99
  
Feldstein mainly considers the importance of a state as a protector of one’s wealth and a 
benefit which an owner automatically obtains from it. ‘In other words, if it could be 
established as an empirical regularity that demand for public goods is positively wealth 
elastic, then the benefit principle can serve as an argument for the introduction of a net 
wealth tax.’100 This argument is based on theories of Locke, Hume and Rousseau from the 
beginning of industrial period when states were seen as protectors of property.
101
 Hence, its 
application to the current form of wealth is limited in view of the fact that revenue collected 
from net wealth tax certainly exceeds costs required for rendering the ‘protection’ services 
such as judicial protection, fire protection and law enforcement. One should also dispute that 
the richest individuals are able to fund their own security in contrast to the extremely poor. 
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What's more, this revenue would not be able to use for other welfare unconnected to 
protection of one’s wealth. The same applies for earlier mentioned unearned increases of real 
properties caused by the provision of services funded by the state.    
 
 
4.3.3 Social control and fairer distribution of wealth 
The subsection 3.1 of this research has already provided detailed overview of the wealth 
inequality in modern Britain. It is a common perception that uneven wealth distribution might 
have serious economic and social consequences on the society caused by an unequal access to 
opportunities.
102
 Wealth taxes may well also be supported by the argument of social control 
which is the most common within the general public and politicians.  
Strong pattern of wealth inequality is however also evident across different age groups of the 
society. Over half of the top tenth richest households in the United Kingdom were aged 45-
64.
103
 This is not unforeseen information since people tend to accumulate wealth over their 
working life and just before the retirement age they reach the top of their personal wealth. 
Intergenerational exchange and income persistence is significant in OECD countries.
104
 Net 
wealth tax could hence be also justified by equalising income and wealth differences of an 
individual’s life cycle.  
4.3.4 Positive effects on the economy 
Net wealth tax could arguably have also positive effects on the economy. Firstly, older 
literature
105
 proposes an argument that the next wealth taxation improves economic efficiency 
by inducing a taxpayer to look for more profitable investments in order to counter-balance 
costs of the additional taxation.
106
 The theory applies chiefly to those with more significant 
wealth since the costs for obtaining information about potential more efficient investments 
are not trivial. In addition, Hansson claims that wealth taxation may ‘...encourage investment 
in human capital, the most important component of national wealth and likely a crucial 
factor behind economic growth.’107 This model is nonetheless rather debatable and Ihori 
believes that wealth taxation has an opposite, negative effect on investment in human 
capital.
108
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Secondly, net wealth tax is a solution of reduction of inequalities and access to opportunities 
within the society which in turn might have detrimental effects on the growth rate. 
Academics however are not uniform about its economic significance.
109
      
Thirdly, Kocherlakota declares further argument why wealth taxation might be a positive 
feature of optimal taxation. He believes that skills used to turn effort into output evolve 
stochastically. These skills may emerge and vanish without a notice. While people need to be 
insured against these ‘skill shocks’, net wealth tax presents the right balancer to these life-
cycle changes.
110
 His research is based on the assumption that the state is only provider of 
insurance against skill shocks. In this context, periodic, commonly annual net wealth tax is 
more efficient and provides less volatility than one-off sporadic levy attributable to wealth 
transfer taxes. This hypothesis goes in hand with both paternalistic and utilitarian approaches. 
Paternalists consider that an individual is not able take reasonable steps to be prepared for 
skill shocks and utilitarians claim that tax utility, an insurance against skill shock, determines 
tax liabilities of an individual and implies wider welfare. 
4.4 Negatives of net wealth tax implementation 
4.4.1 Negative effects on the economy 
Nearly every tax distorts economic behaviour and consequently decreases economic 
efficiency.
111
 Adverse effect on economic performance is a widespread criticism of net 
wealth tax. For instance, Prof. Lodin was a particularly strong supporter of wealth tax 
abolition in Sweden, claiming that it is an awful tax which ‘...not only distorting investment 
behaviour, but driving capital out of the country.’112  
It is extremely difficult to conduct sufficiently forceful empirical research which would 
irrefutably attest or disprove an existence of negative direct effects on the economy. This is 
due to the complexity of the issue and high number of factors affecting the growth rate. In her 
study in 2010, Hansson found robust support for the argument that wealth taxes hinder 
economic growth however its estimated magnitude is relatively modest.
113
 Studies on this 
topic are particularly scarce and to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the only 
research of its kind. Hence, results will be taken with caution.    
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Some academics also suggest that net wealth tax might contribute to so-called capital drain. It 
has ‘...a harmful effect on the country’s economic activity, causing productive capital to leave 
and discouraging foreign investors from coming in.’114 Nevertheless Pippin et al. challenge 
this statement and they claim that changes in country’s taxation strategy, including net wealth 
taxation, does not necessarily has to lead to cross country migrations.
115
  
Whether or not net wealth taxation affects cross country migration of capital, it is certain that 
it decreases the amount of available capital for new start-up projects and hence detrimentally 
affects entrepreneurship. A subsidiary side effect is also reduced pay-off for a successful 
project which might affect a decision of an individual whether to remain an employee or to 
become self-employed.
 116
      
4.4.2 Administrative costs and avoidance 
Given that the tax base of net wealth tax is significantly larger in comparison to income tax, 
in order to counter all avoidance practices it has to encompass high administrative costs. 
Periodic valuations of one’s wealth are at the centre of the problem since it imposes 
compliance costs on the taxpayer and administrative costs on revenue.
117
 For instance, the 
problem is a valuation of self-occupied property which has not been on the market for 
decades which is the main asset of the middle class household in the United Kingdom. Even 
harder is to appreciate hope value on land before planning permission has been granted. 
Logically, costs of valuation even further multiply for assets held overseas. On the other 
hand, if individual’s wealth will not be assessed on regular basis or overseas territories would 
be exempted, it would open floodgates for avoidance through manipulations with asset values 
or flow of assets abroad from the United Kingdom. Glennerster believes that it is precisely 
extreme administrative costs and difficulty of valuation of individual’s wealth on annual basis 
what made an implementation of net wealth tax in the United Kingdom impractical in past.
118
 
In the United Kingdom there is not a constitutional principle of equality similar to one in the 
German basic law which was a reason for finding German wealth tax unconstitutional due to 
inconsistent valuation process. Still, it shall be noted that preferential treatment to some 
assets which might be easier to assess has a prospective to render the entire wealth tax system 
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inefficient.
119
 In overall, if the valuation shall be regular and effective it might encompass 
higher administrative costs than revenue itself.  
In respect of valuation of wealth, it should be highlighted that some assets are impossible to 
include in tax base. It was already discussed in subsection 4.3.4 how net wealth tax affects 
investments in human capital (education, talents, income potential, knowledge etc.) and why 
it is the most valuable asset for an individual. Indeed, the assessment of a current value of 
potential earnings made in the future, which will be taxed in the future is truly unworkable.
120
 
Secondly, the subsection 3.1 based on the national statistics established that the most sizeable 
material asset of the top tenth wealthiest households in the United Kingdom are pension 
savings rights. Similarly as above, practical constraints with valuation precludes a taxation of 
pension rights. It shall be said that the United Kingdom collects tax on pensions as a source 
of income and as a wealth transfer through an inheritance tax. Undeniably, it is a dilemma in 
the face of efficiency and equitability if authorities are not able to include the most valuable 
material (pension rights) and intangible (human capital) assets of an individual into tax base.          
Final consideration shall be given to deductible liabilities. In order for net wealth tax to be 
efficient and equitable it must reflect only net wealth of individual, i.e. gross wealth shall be 
deducted by debts and other liabilities. This is a fundamental character of this tax. However, 
if liabilities are arising overseas where they are not to be taxed, one may practically avoid 
rather simply entire wealth tax in the United Kingdom. Adding this problem to above 
mentioned problem of asset valuation, ‘...the net worth tax easily degenerates into a tax on 
real estate only.’121 
4.4.3 Fairness considerations 
In the perspective of contemporary economists who accept pay-ability principle and 
importance of redistribution within the system, net wealth tax is a rather equitable tax. 
Particularly vertical equity within the system is safeguarded since those with higher ability 
are asked to contribute more. Providing there would not be problems with assessment of 
wealth, the system would be also horizontally equitable.   
Political considerations are not integral part of the research yet few brief comments shall be 
made of how public perceives net wealth tax and why its implementation would be 
challenging. Prabhakar’s research clarifies that people in Britain find it unfair to tax assets 
which were already taxed through income tax or other taxes,
122
 what effectively becomes an 
economic double taxation. This rationale follows the non-utilitarian approach discussed in the 
subsection 4.2, especially if assets falling within the scope of wealth tax do not generate an 
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additional benefit for the proprietor other than was already taxed.  Public also tend to view 
net wealth tax as excessively onerous for ‘asset-rich, cash poor’ part of the society. Mirleess 
et al. claim that ‘this seems to reflect the fact that perceptions of fairness in tax are more 
closely linked to the relationship of the tax to flows of income than to stocks of wealth.
123
  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter methodically analysed positive and negative factors of net wealth tax. The 
theoretical framework with a brief historical perspective was also provided. The study has 
established that there are number of credibly arguments why net wealth shall be taxed 
additionally. The strongest rationales appeared to be pay-ability principle and positive effects 
of the tax which helps redistribution of the wealth in the society and decreases inequalities. 
The benefit argument and positive effects on the entire economy on the other hand does not 
seem to equally persuasive. Particularly benefit argument could be undermined by the 
amount of tax revenue and logic limitations connected with the benefit itself.  
Negative effects of the net wealth tax on economy dominate other spectrum of arguments. 
While the amount of empirical economic research is limited, there are vigorous signs that 
dumped growth rate could be a result of net wealth tax. In addition, high administrative costs 
in modern mobile world and inability to tax human capital and pensions rights renders it 
impracticable to make this tax efficient and equitable.  
5  Property tax 
The previous chapter has focused on positive and negative aspects of net wealth tax and 
rationales behind it. This chapter will follow the same pattern and will scrutinise property 
taxation. 
5.1 Theoretical framework 
Property tax is a simplified form of wealth taxation where levy is not imposed on other assets 
except on the real estate of an individual. It is an impersonal- in rem type of the tax. In past, 
the United Kingdom used to apply various forms of the property tax including rather 
simplistic ‘Window tax’ introduced in 1696 based on the number of windows of a property. 
With the exception of Council tax, the United Kingdom does not levy any other periodic tax 
on properties at the moment.  
Property tax is one of the most ancient taxes. It was levied far before income tax or other 
taxes on flows of income and expenditure for various economic and practical reasons. It 
represents stable, easy to verify tax base with large revenue potential and with moderately 
small distortions of economic behaviour caused by limited responsiveness of supply to 
price.
124
 Mainly land (separate from taxable property in general) is singled out as a perfect tax 
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base for its efficiency and equity grounds.
125
 Based on its identifiable and unchangeable 
geographic position, property tax has been a popular source of financing for local 
municipalities.
126
 
There are different forms of properties and each of them has different characteristics. It will 
be helpful to differentiate between: land, business property and residential dwelling. 
Residential dwelling might be further divided into owner-occupied and rented dwelling 
however due to their comparable nature no distinction will be made for the purposes of this 
paper.    
Given that property tax is a form of wealth tax, it has naturally various common advantages 
and disadvantages which are discussed below.  
5.2 Advantages and rationales of property tax implementation 
5.2.1 The ability to pay principle 
In line with the structure of advantages of net wealth tax discussed in previous chapter 4.3, 
the first consideration shall be given to pay-ability principle. It was already concluded, that an 
ability to contribute of Person 1 whose income is acquired from investment is certainly higher 
in comparison to Person 2 who has an annual salary of the same amount. In respect of 
properties, similar is applicable however not so straightforward. Two examples shall be 
made. If Person 1 acquires the income from renting his real estate property and Person 2 
earns exactly the same amount from his employment, it is relatively effortless to conclude 
that the ability to pay of Person 1 is higher. Conversely, if we compare Person 1 with the 
rental income and Person 2 with the income from interests on savings of the same amount, 
the conclusion is more blurred. Arguably, Person 2 ability is even higher since the liquidity of 
his investment/savings is higher in contrast to the rented property of Person 1 who is unable 
to easily capitalise his property or partially decrease a share in it. In other words, if Person 1 
owns a property of the value of £200 000 and rental income of £20 000 (cash available is £20 
000) and Person 2 has savings of £200 000 and interests of £20 000 (cash available is £220 
000), Person 1 remains to be £200 000 cash down compare to Person 2.
127
 Their ability could, 
at most, be perceived as equal. Additional taxation of property would hence create an obscure 
situation of horizontal inequality where investment in savings are taxed only as interests 
income but rental property is taxed once on the level of property tax and secondly on the 
level of rental income.
128
 This is providing that net wealth taxation is not levied. Even more 
obscure situation arises if rental income of Person 1 would be imputed for owner-occupied 
residential property. Person 1 would not have any tangible income, hence in comparison to 
Person 2 his ability would be lower but his tax liability higher.           
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5.2.2 The benefit considerations and redistribution 
The second and third mentioned rationales for net wealth tax were the benefit considerations 
and redistribution within the society. No additional separate analysis is required for property 
taxation since findings are mutually applicable apart of a brief remark, that benefit argument 
cannot propose any justification whatsoever for taxation of land or property that is 
unoccupied or otherwise utilised by an individual or corporate entity. On the contrary, an 
exemption for unused land or property is in practice particularly rare.    
5.2.3 Positive effects on economy 
Lastly, positive effects of property taxation shall be examined. Similarly to net wealth tax, 
property taxation has a potential to: improve economic efficiency by inducing a taxpayer to 
look for more profitable investments in order to counter-balance costs of the additional 
taxation; and to reduce inequalities within the society what in turn might have detrimental 
effects on the growth rate.    
In addition, if property tax were a substitute to another more harmful tax which distorts 
economic behaviour more significantly, its existence would have a positive effect on 
economy. Economists are uniform in their support for taxation of land. If taxed distinct to 
value of property on it, it could be taxed at arbitrarily high rate without discouraging any 
desirable activity. This based in the fact that supply of land is fixed and cannot be changed by 
a levy on land. Secondly, ‘with the same amount of land available, people would not be 
willing to pay any more for it than before, so (the present value of) a land value tax (LVT) 
would be reflected one-for-one in a lower price of land: the classic example of tax 
capitalization.’129 Johansson et al. suggest that transfer of one percent of income tax to 
property tax would have positive change on economic growth of up to one percent.
130
     
Mirrless et al. also argue that taxation of residential dwellings would eliminate distortion in 
favour of owner-occupier which is currently caused by lack of such taxation. According to 
their view, housing is consumption and because it is VAT exempt, it shall be taxed in other 
way.   
5.3 Negatives of property tax implementation 
5.3.1 Negative effects on economy 
In contrast to taxation of land and residential dwellings which would arguably either cure 
current distortions of economic behaviour or not cause such distortions, this positive effect 
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cannot be said about taxation of business premises which would certainly lead to dead weight 
loss in economy.
131
 
5.3.2 Administrative costs and avoidance 
Musgrave and other economists
132
 believe that operating costs of the property tax might be 
high, particularly if valuations of properties shall be made on comprehensibly detailed and 
periodic basis.
133
 It was already mentioned that there is a problem of a valuation of self-
occupied property which has not been on the market for decades which is the main asset of 
the middle class household in the United Kingdom, not mentioning hope value of particular 
land.
134
  
It was suggested above that taxation of land makes a perfect economic sense due to fixed 
amount of supply and virtually inflexible price. It is nevertheless exceptionally problematic to 
separate value of land and property built on that land.
135
 This appears to be a formidable task 
and presents a crack in taxation of land only.        
Lastly, considerations to potential tax avoidance shall be given. Complications with 
deductible liabilities were already discussed above in the subsection 4.4.2, similarly as the 
conclusion that gross value of property for tax assessment purposes would not be beneficial. 
Moreover, there is an additional potential for avoidance. Economists are not sure which 
forms of a real estate shall be included for the property taxation purposes. If property taxation 
encompassed all types including business property, it would be uniformly practical to apply it 
yet it would distort economic behaviour. On the other hand, if business property was 
exempted, taxpayers might be encouraged to ‘envelope’ residential buildings by corporate 
entities and in this way avoid annual payments of property tax. Naturally, measures may be 
taken to counter such avoidance, similar to the ‘Annual Tax on Enveloped Dwellings’ 
(ATED) introduced by Finance Bill 2013 which came into effect on 1 April 2013, however 
that would significantly increase administration and compliance costs of that tax. 
5.3.3 Fairness considerations 
If the property tax were implemented in the form discussed in this chapter, it would be a 
rather inequitable tax. This statement is based on the assumption that other forms of 
investments such as savings or other intangible assets producing an income would not be 
subject to additional levy in contrast to a property, regardless whether it produces and income 
or not. This would lead to horizontal inequality since those of the same ability to contribute 
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are taxed differently.
136
 Subsequently, vertical equality of the system would only hardly be 
sustained.
137
   
5.4 Conclusion  
It was demonstrated that property tax shares number of common advantages and 
disadvantages with net wealth tax. The main advantage of property tax appears to be 
relatively small distortion of economic behaviour which is attributable especially to land tax. 
Redistribution of wealth within the society may be a plausible rationale for its 
implementation. Fuelled by the redistribution considerations, the government has already 
tackled high value residential properties. It has increased Stamp Duty on residential 
properties of the value over £2M bought by corporate entities to 15%; increased charge to 
capital gains tax on 28% for a disposal of residential properties of value over £2M held by 
corporate owners; and introduced Annual Tax on Enveloped Dwellings.
138
 On the other hand, 
rationales for implementation of property tax based the ability to pay principle are not 
persuasive. Neither horizontal equity nor vertical equity would be guaranteed in the system 
providing other forms of investments are not taxed similarly. In comparison to net wealth tax, 
administration and avoidance of property tax is lower yet still problems with divergence of 
land and property value or annual valuation of properties must be taken with caution. 
Finally, two following considerations shall be made. Commentators incline to be supporting 
taxation of residential dwellings based on the theory that housing is form of consumption 
therefore it shall be taxed accordingly. It appears to be simpler and less burdensome solution 
to impose VAT on newly built houses regardless its potential distorting effect on market. 
Secondly, it was mentioned in the subsection of benefit considerations that an owner of the 
property does nothing for an increase of the value of its property in contrast to community 
which invests in local infrastructure and other services. Hence, it should be incorrect for an 
owner to benefit from it without a contribution. Counter argument to this statement however 
might be an existence of capital gains tax on disposal of properties which is currently in 
force. Taxation of an increased property value at the moment of an increase is merely 
deferred until the point when the owner decides to dispose this property. In overall, the 
current tax system requires, on deferred basis, an owner to contribute for an increase of the 
value of his property caused by provision of public services. 
6 Discussion 
Based on conclusions of previous chapters of the paper, this chapter will be dedicated to 
comparative analyses of Council tax vs. property tax; and wealth transfer taxes of the current 
system vs. net wealth tax. 
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6.1 Council tax vs. property tax 
Both Council and property taxes are not ideal forms of taxation hence it would be tricky to 
conclude whether property tax is an apparent alternative to the current version of Council tax. 
Indeed, without a major reform these taxes cannot run in conjunction with each other since 
both of them would target the same tax base. Council tax is a no doubt spine of local council 
finances and funds inevitable local services. As a hybrid tax, to certain level it already 
combines characteristics of a property tax, yet by charging only residential dwellings it leaves 
business premises and land separately untaxed. The most vocal argument for implementation 
of property tax on dwellings is that it is equal to other forms of consumption. Council tax 
already fulfils this function. Naturally, one might argue that introduction of VAT on newly 
built dwellings would be sufficient. 
On the other hand, Council tax is literally inequitable tax, both horizontally and vertically, 
because it is regressive. While the analysis of property tax in this paper suggested that 
property tax would not be flawlessly equitable in contrast to other forms of investments, it 
would be more equitable within the same range of other properties since the amount of 
charge would rise pari passu to value of property. Hence, the horizontal and vertical equality 
would remain.  
The correct solution appears to lie in between. If Council tax would adopt progressivity 
nature of property tax and include arbitrarily high taxation of land but remains to partially be 
a tax on consumption with low operating costs, it would be a more equitable tax which would 
potentially bring more revenue without distortion of an economic behaviour.             
6.2 Wealth transfer taxes vs. net wealth tax 
Two forms of wealth transfer taxes of the current tax system in the United Kingdom were 
discussed, Inheritance tax and Stamp Duty land tax. Both of these taxes were heavily 
criticised and author has not found credible arguments for their existence. Their combined 
revenue is less than one and half percent of total receipts hence their economic significance is 
marginal. Inheritance tax was found to be entirely inequitable and easy to avoid. Whereas 
SDLT were analysed to be equitable and fairly efficient tax in respect of operating costs and 
amount of potential avoidance, it has immense detrimental effects on economy through 
distortion of economic behaviour what leads to decreased efficiency and lower economic 
output.    
For comparison of wealth transfer taxes, net wealth tax is used. The paper has shown that net 
wealth shall be taxed additionally based on pay-ability principle and positive effects of the 
tax which helps redistribution of the wealth in the society and decreases inequalities. Besides, 
its enormous tax base in contrast to Inheritance tax and SDLT is attractive for any 
government. These advantages however do not outweigh its drawbacks. Evidence clarified 
that net wealth tax is responsible for dumped growth rate and decreased investments into 
human capital. Moreover, high administrative and practical constraints make author to do not 
counsel an implementation of net wealth tax in the United Kingdom.   
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In general, the author proposes to abolish both Inheritance tax and SDLT based on arguments 
mentioned earlier. Still, an implementation of net wealth tax is not advisable. Since paper had 
endeavoured to discuss revenue-neutral suggestions, the marginal windfall loss of revenue of 
one and half percent caused by abolition of wealth transfer taxes could be substituted by 
higher revenue from amended Council tax.   
7 Concluding remarks 
In the current times of severe economic downturn of the world economy, politicians, public 
and media discuss on daily basis an introduction of alternative forms of taxation which have 
potential to increase revenue for the government. Net wealth and property taxation belongs to 
the most popular ones and are described by some as ideally equitable, efficient and 
unavoidable taxes. This paper has analysed whether net wealth and property taxation would 
be the right solution for the government’s attempt to decrease the budget deficit and the 
alternative to other forms of taxation applied in the current system. Particularly, property tax 
was compared to current Council tax and net wealth tax was contrasted to two current wealth 
transfer taxes- Inheritance and Stamp Duty land tax.  
The thesis firstly discussed key features of desirable tax system and then methodically 
applied each form of the taxation towards this framework. Special attention was given to 
horizontal and vertical equality of the system; efficiency; administration and compliance 
costs; and finally potential for tax avoidance. While this topic is situated in the context of the 
current pressurised political and economic situation in the United Kingdom, political 
assumptions were limited to minimum, unavoidable level. In contrast, the subject was 
analysed from perspectives of legal theory, economic and social reflection aspects. 
Notwithstanding this, the paper was a public finance research with the main focus of 
analysing and designing optimal taxation for the United Kingdom.      
In line with the original hypothesis, this research concluded that net wealth tax is not as ideal 
form of taxation as it is perceived by its supporters. While there are credible rationales for its 
introduction, its negative aspects are undeniable and in the opinion of the author prevail over 
positives. Rather surprisingly, the author has also established that current forms of wealth 
transfer taxes shall be abolished even though it might cause a marginal windfall loss of tax 
revenue. Alternatives to cover this dropout were briefly suggested. The outcome of property 
tax analysis is slightly more ambiguous. Still, its introduction which would be a substitution 
or mere addition to highly criticised Council tax is not suggested. The author on the other 
hand proposed to merge positive factors of these two forms of taxation and also to tax land 
separately. 
Outcomes of this study shall be treated as provisional and read with a caution due to limited 
amount of resources and alien empirical data used. This research was mainly based on 
fundamental theoretical and academic principles of taxation rather than own empirical 
research. For further more detailed research it would be desirable to acquire precise data 
covering effects of the net wealth transfer tax; the amount of the current tax avoidance; the 
estimate of tax revenue of the property and net wealth tax if it would be implemented; and the 
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estimate amount of potential avoidance of such taxes. Secondly, this thesis has not taken into 
account political constraints which might affect plausibility of introduction or abolition of a 
particular tax. For instance, net wealth tax or property tax for dwellings of high value is a 
politically attractive theme and practical considerations might be disregarded. Analogically, 
the author suggested abolition of Stamp Duty land tax, however since many developed 
economies apply similar form of property transaction tax, there is only small possibility for 
its abandonment in the current economic climate. 
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